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 1 
Reconsidering the laboratory thesis: Palestine/Israel and the geopolitics of 
representation 
ABSTRACT 
Recently, there has been a surge of interest in the notion of Palestine/Israel as a 
‘laboratory’ for the production and export of advanced weapons, security knowhow and 
technology. Critics of Israeli wars and the ongoing colonization of Palestine use the 
laboratory metaphor to make sense of Israeli state policies and practices used in 
controlling Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) and fighting wars but also to address 
how Israeli instruments of violence come to travel elsewhere. This article brings these 
discussions into sharper focus by examining how the concept of the laboratory is 
employed in making sense of Israel’s perceived centrality in global patterns violence and 
militarism, here termed the laboratory thesis. I argue that although the thesis develops 
powerful insights, it has analytical limitations. I further call into question its polemical 
force, suggesting that critical references to Palestine/Israel as a laboratory reinforce 
misleading ideological tropes at the core of Israel’s settler colonial project. I take these 
concerns as an opportunity to re-assemble the policing/security laboratory as a critical 
concept, in relation to Palestine/Israel, the global war on terror and beyond.  
Keywords: Security Assemblages; Human Testing; Settler Colonialism; Actor-network 
Theory; War Economy; Zionism  
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INTRODUCTION 
Recently, there has been a surge of interest in the notion of Palestine/Israel as a 
‘laboratory’ for the production and export of advanced weapons, security knowhow and 
technology. Critics of Israeli wars and the ongoing colonization of Palestine use the 
laboratory metaphor to make sense of Israeli state policies and practices in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories (OPT) but also to address how Israeli instruments of violence 
repression come to travel elsewhere. They suggest that Israeli security forces’ ability to 
‘experiment’ on surplus Palestinian lives has facilitated Israel’s rise as a major global 
exporter of conventional weapons, security knowhow and technologies (Denes 2011; 
Gordon 2009). Yotam Feldman articulates these arguments in his 2013 documentary The 
Lab. As Feldman (2014) writes of the film’s central claim: “the product they [Israelis] are 
selling is unique. Rather than rifles, rockets or bombs, the Israeli companies sell their 
experience. The long-running conflict with the Palestinians has created a unique and 
unrivalled laboratory for testing technologies and ideas relating to “asymmetric warfare” 
[…]. In this manner the Israeli conflict with the Palestinians may be seen as a national 
asset—rather than a burden”. As a result, Israel relies on the confinement and repression 
of Palestinians in sustaining its export-led economy, thereby sustaining the Occupation 
and increasing the likelihood and intensity of future wars. This is what I term the 
laboratory thesis.  
While Feldman advances it most vividly, critical scholars (Li, 2006; Weizman, 
2007; Graham, 2011), journalists (Cook, 2008; Silver, 2012; Klein, 2007) and activists 
(Who Profits, 2014) advance similar claims. References to the term ‘laboratory’ are also 
put to work in more affirmative ways. Advocates of Israeli policies invoke the concept as 
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a validation of the country’s alleged success in ‘surviving’ in the face of existential 
threats (Byman, 2011: 9; Jonathan-Zamir, Weisburd, & Hasisi, 2014: 9, 11). Despite 
important differences between these affirmative and critical references to the laboratory, 
there is an agreement that Israel has cultivated a status as a leading security purveyor due, 
in part, to the status of either the State of Israel, the OPT (or both) as laboratory-like 
experimental spaces. Across these accounts the term ‘laboratory’ plays three key roles. 
First, it acts as an empirical representation of particular spaces, places and zones of 
policy experimentation. Second, it serves as an explanatory concept for addressing how 
Israel has emerged a major exporter of weapons, security technology and expertise. 
Third, we can detect that ‘laboratory’ has a normative valence attached to its usage: the 
term plays a role both in critiquing and celebrating Israeli security approaches and their 
global reach. The fact that the term laboratory is increasingly referenced in relation to 
Palestine/Israel appears to indicate something important. Yet its usage for diametrically 
opposed political agendas raises questions about how the concept actually works 
analytically and politically. Moreover, despite disagreement about whether the status of 
Palestine/Israel as a laboratory is deserving of praise or condemnation, there is little 
debate about the concept of the laboratory itself – in other words, what the laboratory is. 
The term has been taken for granted as self-evident and unproblematic by mainstream 
commentators and critics alike. 
This article examines how the concept of the laboratory is employed in making 
sense of Israel’s perceived centrality in global patterns of violence and militarism. It takes 
the form of a review and intervention into the laboratory thesis, a largely critical body of 
literature with important analytical and political contributions. I consider epistemological 
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issues about how truth claims are constructed through references to the laboratory but 
also address ontological questions about the veracity of these claims. In calling it a thesis 
I do not mean to homogenize all references to the laboratory as singular argument. The 
concept’s usage varies and these differences bear recognition. Nevertheless, these uses 
converge in important ways. I argue that although the thesis develops powerful insights, 
it has analytical limitations. I further call into question its polemical force, suggesting that 
critical references to Palestine/Israel as a laboratory reinforce dominant evolutionary 
tropes of Zionism. As a result the thesis falls short of its potential as a provocation about 
settler colonial violence and its complex relationships to Israel’s position as a global 
security leader. My broad concern here is “the historiographical presumption of 
progressive history that supports the idea of Zionism as the unfolding realization of an 
ideal” (Butler, 2012:100, emphasis added) but also more specific claims including the 
notion that self-sufficient innovation in science and technology has allowed Israel 
triumph against the odds, the false sense of symmetrical “sides” in the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict and representations of Israeli statecraft as a kind of omnipotent form of 
domination that is at once exceptional and universal. I take my concerns about the thesis 
as an opportunity to re-assemble the concept of the policing/security laboratory, situating 
this project as part of a broader refutation of teleological developmentalist ideologies at 
the core of settler colonial projects. 
The terms of my intervention are informed by two key claims within the field of 
critical geopolitics. First, is the understanding that “geopolitics is not a singularity but a 
plurality” based on competing “representational practices” across different societies 
(ÓTuathail & Dalby, 1998: 4). Second, is the insistence that studying geopolitics cannot 
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be neutral (Dalby, 1991). More specifically, critical geopolitics is guided by an 
underlying counter-hegemonic imperative to “problematize […] the “is” of “geography” 
and “geopolitics,” their status as self-evident, natural, foundational, and eminently 
knowable realities” (ÓTuathail, 1996: 52). In mounting a challenge to “commonsense 
understandings incorporated in widely prevalent geographs”, critical geopolitics calls on 
scholars to “investigate the politics of the geographical specification of politics”, in other 
words “to practice critical geopolitics” (Dalby, 1991: 274). Yet feminist critiques of this 
literature are equally instructive. They have shown that critical geopolitics scholarship 
reproduces geopolitics as a disembodied, exclusionary and masculinist practice, 
unwittingly reinforcing the authority of dominant voices whilst perpetuating the silence 
of others (Sharp, 2000; Sparke, 2000). Building on this work, I interrogate the laboratory 
as an increasingly common and taken-for-granted geograph within discussions about 
violence and militarism. The article proceeds as follows. The first section reviews 
literature invoking the term ‘laboratory’, exploring its key claims, aims and contributions. 
The second section develops a preliminary critique of the laboratory thesis. The third 
section proposes strategies for re-invigorating the thesis.  
1. THE LABORATORY THESIS 
While references to Palestine/Israel as a laboratory have certain distinctive 
features, they are part of a wider literature on the production and global mobility of 
policing/security knowledge. The volume by Hönke & Müller (2016) on the “global 
making of policing” uses the concept of the laboratory as a core theme that connects 
chapters on Palestine/Israel with a range of other empirical sites (also see Clarno, 2017). 
‘Laboratory’ is employed to address how certain places become zones of 
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“experimentation and control” in which “ideas […] can be tried out” (Slater, 1997: 637) 
and to understand the production and mobility of policing/security ‘models’, in relation to  
‘global’ cities (Amar, 2013; Coaffee, 2004) and in the context of  imperialism (McCoy, 
2009). Colonial spaces have long been represented as “laboratories of modernity” (Stoler 
& Cooper, 1997: 5) in making sense of the constitutive trans-local linkages between core 
and periphery. More recent literature on “war: police assemblages” also invokes the term 
laboratory in addressing how policies are “tested” by militaries (Bachmann, 2015: 43) 
and how conflicts or interventions become sites for “learning lessons” (Khalili, 2015: 
100). I return to these wider discussions in the final section. Yet my references to the 
laboratory thesis pertain strictly to the term’s usage in relation to Palestine/Israel.  
 One of the core arguments advanced by the thesis is that given the country’s small 
population and physical size, Israel seems to have a disproportionate degree of influence 
in shaping contemporary discourses on and practices of security, especially in “niche” 
areas of asymmetric warfare and global pacification (Halper, 2015). For instance, Israel is 
a leading global exporter of drones and an innovator in radical urban warfare and control 
strategies (Graham, 2010a), emerging as a “homeland security capital” (Gordon, 2011). 
This status builds directly on the country’s longstanding role as an exporter of 
conventional weapons and (para)-military training (Beit-Hallahmi, 1987).  
In making sense of Israel’s global influence on matters of security, ‘laboratory’ is 
put to work in a few distinct ways. It is utilized to conceptualize the technological 
development and production of Israeli security products and services at the forefront of 
changes in contemporary warfare and spatial control. As Denes (2011: 179) notes, the 
“prosecution of permanent war [in the OPT] provides the much-vaunted “battlefield 
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laboratory” in which to develop, beta-test, and demonstrate [Israeli] innovations in the 
crafts of war and surveillance” (also see Gordon, 2009: 47-8). Weizman (2012: 96) 
suggests that Gaza can be seen as laboratory in the sense that it “is a hermetically sealed 
zone, with all access controlled by Israel” (with the partial exception of the Egyptian 
border). Li (2006: 38-9) represents the Gaza Strip as a space of experimentation in which 
Israel aspires to create the “optimal balance between maximum control over the territory 
and minimum responsibility for its non-Jewish population” (emphasis in original). Hence, 
the concept of the laboratory draws attention to how Israeli security technologies are 
refined within territorially-bounded colonial spaces.  
Evidence for these claims can be found in marketing materials of Israeli security 
firms where real-life testing is a persistent theme with firms using stamps of approval like 
“Combat Proven”, “Tested in Gaza” and “Approved by the IDF” (Halper, 2015: 143; also 
see Graham, 2010a, 2011; Gordon, 2009, 2011). Israeli security purveyors also frequently 
reference origin narratives about their products—i.e. stories in marketing materials and 
business magazines about how their innovations developed to suit the needs of Israel. 
These promotional strategies present the rise of Israel’s security industries as a natural 
‘response’ to regional threats and frame the emergence of the industry as a ‘domestic’ 
process. According to Gordon (2009: 25): “There is no dispute that many of Israel’s 
homegrown technological skills were honed inside secret military labs and that military 
research has given Israel a clear lead in vital aspects of telecommunications and software 
technology”. He supports this with a quote from an Israeli trade-promotion body: “what 
grew out of a direct military need with a high-tech edge has […] placed Israel at the 
forefront of the global security and homeland security industry” (ibid). 
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 While emphasizing real-life testing and physical enclosure, the laboratory concept 
is also used to understand the mobility of Israeli security technology, expertise, and 
dispossession strategies, both within Palestine/Israel and transnationally. A volume on the 
politics of Israeli architecture notes: “Within and outside of the West Bank, Israel can be 
seen as an example, an accelerator or even as a territorial laboratory playing alternative 
scenarios in fast-forward” (Segal & Weizman, 2003: 25). As Li (2006: 36) argues, “just 
as laboratory experiments are meant to be replicated elsewhere, the territory [of Gaza] is 
a sort of proving ground for practices that could become increasingly relevant in the West 
Bank”. Scholars focus on how Israel’s access to real-world test sites in the OPT 
facilitates the transmission of Israeli security knowhow abroad, arguing that the ability of 
Israeli companies to ‘experiment’ in real-life situations gives them a competitive edge 
(Gordon 2009: 48; Denes 2011: 186). Stockmarr (2016: 66) argues that “[Israeli] 
branding rests on a brutal reality: the testing phase”. As she continues: “[E]very time the 
IDF uses Israeli HLS technology it automatically tests it”. Laleh Khalili’s work is 
exemplary in historicizing Palestine’s “location” within global patterns of violence.  She 
argues that the “violence of Israeli counterinsurgency against Palestinians cannot be 
understood without locating it in a broader global space”, in which Palestine represents 
“an archetypal laboratory and a crucial node of global counterinsurgencies”. She shows 
how the techniques of control and domination developed in Palestine—themselves 
shaped by colonial experiences elsewhere—have come to influence the practices of 
counterinsurgency elsewhere through various “lessons and borrowings” (Khalili, 2013: 
ch. 2), emphasizing that this knowledge transmission is multidirectional.  
As Israeli security experts advise foreign clients around the world, certain 
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practices and technologies associated with Palestine/Israel are becoming influential 
globally. Examples include airborne-targeted assassinations, the growing ubiquity of 
drones in warfare and surveillance and strategies of urban pacification. Authorities 
outside of Israel also clearly view the ‘Israeli experience’ as a source of valuable ‘lessons 
learned’, referencing this ‘experience’ as a “laboratory” (e.g. Henriksen, 2007: 18). In 
light of these interactions, scholars have linked global patterns of violence and control 
with the transmission of Israeli security ‘solutions’ abroad. Graham (2010a: xxii) argues 
that although “the colonization of urban thinking and practice by militarized ideas of 
‘security’ does not have a single source […] the Israeli experience of locking down cities 
and turning the Occupied Territories into permanent, urban prison camps is proving 
especially influential” (also see Hever, 2010: 201). Some have spoken about the 
“Palestinization” of resistance to the US-led occupation of Iraq (Bhattacharyya, 2008: 53-
4; Khoury-Machool, 2003). As Weizman (2007: 9) further argues, “If the Iraqi resistance 
is perceived to have been ‘Palestinized’, the American military has been ‘Israelized’”, in 
the sense that American military planners drew on Israeli expertise in carrying out their 
counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq (also see Graham, 2010b; Gregory, 2004). Others 
suggest an “Israelification” of American policing is underway following the Israeli 
training of US officials (Rabie, 2012).   
In addition to the export of Israeli weapons, security technology and knowhow, 
scholars have argued that Israel’s continuous ‘experiments’ on Palestinians help to 
(re)define the norms governing violence internationally. As Weizman (2012: 96) argues: 
“Most significantly of all, it is the thresholds that are tested and pushed: the limits of the 
law, and the limits of violence that can be inflicted by a state and be internationally 
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tolerated”. In other words, Israel is not simply an innovator in techniques of violence but 
re-defines what counts as ‘permissible’ conduct.    
Critics also use the laboratory concept to illustrate how Israel’s commoditization 
of ‘combat proven’ knowledge, helps to perpetuate, legitimize and entrench its colonial 
designs. As Silver (2012) puts it, Israel “gets a “(kick)back out of conflict”, thereby 
allowing the country to sustain economic growth within a climate of global economic 
instability (also see Klein, 2007; Gordon, 2009: 47). As Israel has solidified its position 
as a leading exporter of conventional weaponry and security products and services, it has 
posted strong economic numbers. So although Israel accounts for roughly 2% of global 
weapons sales, the country posts the highest per capita ratio of weapons exports (Halper, 
2015). As a result, commentators link its strong overall economic performance to its 
growing share of the global security and arms market (see Gordon, 2009; Hever, 2010: 
74-79), alongside Israel’s shift to a neoliberal export-led economy (Clarno, 2017; Nitzan 
& Bichler, 2002). Representations of the OPT as a laboratory thereby underscore how 
Israel’s confinement of and experimentation on Palestinians sustains its economy, 
prolongs the Occupation and increases the incidence and intensity of violence.   
As we have seen, ‘laboratory’ is put to work in describing empirical patterns of 
violence and control on the ground Palestine/Israel. It also helps to conceptualize these 
dynamics relationally on a global scale, exploring “how state formations or histories, 
logics of oppression and exploitation are linked, whether causally or symbolically, 
ideationally or semantically” (Goldberg, 2009: 1276). Yet the laboratory thesis also 
represents something more. Naomi Klein’s (2007) suggestion that “Palestinians […] are 
no longer just targets” but now have become “guinea pigs”, attempt to re-draw the 
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boundaries of popular debate surrounding Israel-Palestine conflict on the left. By this I 
mean that critical references to the laboratory seek to reveal how the oppression of 
Palestinians is an intentional outcome of Israeli statecraft that is instrumentally exploited 
as a source of profit. As Feldman (2014) argues, “an unknown truth seems to underlie the 
public façade” behind Israel’s economic success. This “big secret” includes the close 
“relationship between a network of military generals, politicians and private business; the 
use of current military operations as a promotional device for private business […and] 
the brutal employment of the Israeli experience” (ibid). Critics thereby reference the 
laboratory in their efforts to politicize Israel’s position as a leading purveyor of security 
knowhow, military equipment and high technologies by exposing concealed facts behind 
the country’s rise as an ‘economic miracle’.  
Drawing attention to the politicizing impulses the laboratory thesis is not a 
critique of it. Nor is it to suggest that all references to the laboratory are equally or self-
consciously ‘political’. It is, rather, to stress that the laboratory concept is deployed 
within a force-field of claims about how forms of violence and militarism in 
Palestine/Israel should be represented. This is made evident by the fact the concept is not 
only mobilized in the service of critique. As an Israeli counter-terrorism scholar notes: 
“Unfortunately, the extent and nature of the terrorism with which Israel has had to cope 
have made it a world-class laboratory for examining a democratic country’s ability to 
tackle […] terrorism” (Ganor, 2013: 227). Thus whereas critics reference the laboratory 
as an indictment of how settler violence is being instrumentalized and commoditized, 
advocates of Israeli statecraft use ‘laboratory’ euphemistically as confirmation that these 
measures are unintended but nevertheless legitimate, largely effective and consistent with 
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liberal democracy.  
These ‘uses’ of the laboratory concept reveal three key things. First, references to 
the laboratory come with normative valences. More specifically, the laboratory concept 
has at least two competing political ‘use values’ that hinge on intent and responsibility. 
Whereas critics use the concept to expose how the Israeli state cynically exploits 
Palestinian suffering as a ‘resource’, proponents alternatively employ it to suggest that 
Israel is merely ‘responding’ to and ‘managing’ a hostile external environment. As such, 
‘laboratory’ becomes implicated within a broader geopolitics of representation 
surrounding the colonization of Palestine, i.e. how this process should be represented, 
theorized, affirmed or contested through spatial metaphors. Second, and as a corollary, 
the meaning of the laboratory concept appears at least somewhat malleable: claims that 
Palestine/Israel functions as a laboratory are mobilized toward competing, inconsistent 
arguments. Finally, the above discussion illustrates that the different dimensions of the 
laboratory thesis (descriptive, analytical, political) are deeply entangled and difficult to 
isolate. As I explore next, the laboratory thesis also suffers from a number of limitations.  
2. A CRITIQUE OF THE LABORATORY THESIS   
 
In this section I evaluate the laboratory thesis, arguing its insights are less than 
fully groundbreaking and analytically robust. I begin by addressing some ontological 
issues concerning the accuracy of key claims advanced by the thesis and then develop a 
broader critique. I argue that the thesis’ findings converge with many of the dubious 
ideological claims of Israeli state officials and security industry representatives, 
providing limited disagreement about the basic terms of debate.  
Production 
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One set of problems concern the role of the laboratory concept in theorizing the 
production of Israeli security solutions. Israeli products and services are branded as 
unique through claims to combat-proven capabilities, hermetic enclosure and homegrown 
self-sufficiency/domesticity. These claims clearly matter in selling Israeli security 
solutions and legitimizing Israeli policies. They also reflect the fact that the rise of 
Israel’s weapons industry emerged in response to the 1967 arms embargo imposed on 
Israel by France (see Aharoni, 1991). Yet industry claims cannot be taken at face value; 
doing so obscures the constitutive role of transnational connections in Israel’s rise as a 
global security purveyor. Early attempts by Israel to develop greater self-sufficiency in its 
weapons production relied heavily on transnational capital flows (Barnett, 1992), a trend 
which endures today. Many Israeli-based firms operate through joint ventures to develop, 
manufacture and market their products (see Gordon, 2009: 20; Graham, 2011: 149). 
Graham (2011b) claims that “the US-Israel security-military-industrial complexes are 
becoming umbilically connected, to the extent that it would perhaps make more sense to 
consider them as one transnational unit”. In addition, many control strategies and 
technologies used in colonizing Palestine do not originate there. Examples include the 
roles of British imperial knowledge and practices during the 1930s (Khalili 2010, 2013), 
the early imports of weapons from Eastern Europe (Ochs, 2010; Pappé, 2006), the tear-
gassing of protesters using US-manufactured tear gas (Who Profits 2014) and housing 
demolitions carried out with retrofitted US-made D-9 Caterpillar bulldozers (Graham, 
2004). As a result, the forms of ‘experimentation’ carried out in Palestine/Israel do not 
always concern the development of specifically Israeli security solutions. Although many 
Israeli-based security companies have ‘field-tested’ their systems in Palestine/Israel 
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(through formal collaborations with the IDF and contracts with settlers), these firms often 
combine a range of components from around the world within products and services 
branded as ‘Israeli’. So despite their undeniable complicity in colonizing practices, this 
does not mean that these companies’ systems are technologically unique. Moreover, 
while some Israeli firms develop, manufacture and test all of their products in 
Palestine/Israel, this is by no means the rule. This raises questions about whether field-
testing is “automatic” (Stockmarr, 2016: 66).  
Globalization/Mobility  
I also have concerns about the ways the laboratory thesis conceptualizes the 
relationship between the production of Israeli security knowhow and its mobility. 
Scholars imply that strategies and technologies first emerge to meet the needs of Israeli 
security forces, are then tested within the OPT, and then ‘go global’. As Weizman (2012: 
96) notes, the “ability to remotely control large populations is […] tested, before these 
technologies are marketed internationally”. According to Kane (2017), the OPT serves as 
“Israel’s “lab” – a testing ground for new weapons and surveillance tactics that are then 
brought to other regions”. The problem with such claims is not that they are always 
necessarily inaccurate. They capture the trajectories of certain Israeli security 
technologies aptly (Author 2015a). The issue lies with their potential to homogenize and 
gloss over: they take the story of certain Israeli innovations that are unique and asserts it 
as some general rule that applies to all. The laboratory thesis also risks implying that the 
‘field-testing’ of Israeli security solutions takes place primarily within Palestine/Israel 
and its border regions with far less consideration to how Israeli products and services are 
shaped by the requirements of international clientele, albeit with exceptions (e.g. Denes, 
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2011: 183). 
Proponents of the laboratory thesis make extensive descriptive references to the 
hybrid trans-local assemblages of technologies and practices used to carry out the 
Occupation and facilitate ongoing wars, sometimes raising questions about the 
uniqueness of ‘Israeli’ policing/security approaches (e.g. Segal and Weizman, 2003: 26). 
Nevertheless, references to the laboratory tend to privilege the representation of Palestine 
as a hermetically sealed ‘domestic’ space in which the refinement of colonial strategies 
takes place. As a result, the thesis fails to reckon with how the specific local practices and 
technologies involved in carrying out repression and dispossession are co-produced 
through ongoing “worldly encounters” with global capitalism (Tsing, 2005), missing out 
on the “generativity” of the “mixtures” (Franklin, 2007: 133) so essential to Zionism and 
other forms of settler colonialism. Indeed, the implications of authors’ descriptions of 
hybrid assemblages are under-developed. Recognizing the complex multiplicity of 
influences in the production and mobility of Israeli security solutions underscores 
looseness of claims to ‘Israeli-ness’ and in doing so actively troubles the claim that the 
growth of Israel’s security industries represents a “homegrown”, “domestic” process.  
Claims about Israel’s central role in global patterns of violence and militarism, 
though frequently suggested, are insufficiently elaborated. Scholars have noted limits. 
Khalili (2010: 422) emphasizes that the emulation of colonial experiences from Palestine 
historically never resulted in “an exact facsimile” of these practices and tactics elsewhere 
(also see Graham, 2011b: 137). Khalili (2013) further notes that contemporary US and 
Israeli counterinsurgency practices are characterized by key differences, despite the 
points of convergence (also see Denes, 2011: 183; Bhungalia, 2015: 2311). Yet the 
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laboratory thesis suffers from a lack of empirical follow-through. As argued elsewhere, 
despite claims that foreign police forces are becoming “Israelized”, such claims are often 
made in the absence of evidence about what, exactly, has been imparted by Israelis to 
international clients (Author, 2015b). This reflects the tendency among critical scholars 
to assume that security strategies developed in Palestine/Israel can be moved seamlessly 
across transnational space, without much consideration to the frictions, barriers and 
contradictions involved in these processes. I do not mean to suggest that there is no 
evidence that Israel influences discourses and practices of policing/security abroad. Nor 
is it to minimize the stakes of this influence. The point, rather, is to emphasize that 
critical commentators have been imprecise about what travels, how the global 
transmission of Israeli knowhow takes place and the practical consequences of these 
transactions, thereby weakening the force of their claims and potentially overstating 
Israel’s influence in global violence.  
Economy, efficacy & technological determinism  
There are further questions about the relationships between the repression of 
Palestinians and Israel’s prosperity. Despite Israel’s undeniable prowess as a high tech 
leader, Hever (2012: 128) notes that much of the Israeli economy remains “traditional”. 
He points out that Israel’s security industries only represent 10-15% of the country’s total 
exports and around 3-4% of its GDP and 1-3% of its workforce, meaning that “one 
cannot argue that the Israeli economy is primarily based on exploiting the Palestinian 
population” (ibid: 130). Moreover, although Israel is celebrated as a global provider of 
specialized (para)-military knowhow, this edifice is built on its position as the single 
largest recipient of US military aid, thereby disrupting Israel’s self-proclaimed status as a 
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self-sufficient innovator. More broadly, Wolfe (2012: 152) argues that the success of 
Zionism was predicated on Israel’s access to what he calls “preaccumulation”—i.e. 
transnational capital from the Jewish diaspora that was “not conditional on the return of a 
financial profit”. This unsettles a core premise of the laboratory thesis, namely that the 
contemporary Israeli economy is sustained by the exploitation of Palestinian bodies and 
underscores the need to address the reliance on primitive accumulation, not as an initial 
stage of capitalist development but as an enduring feature of settler colonial projects 
(Coulthard, 2014).  
Though significant, these concerns do not represent an insurmountable impasse. 
To a degree, they concern questions of nuance regarding the choice of language used by 
critical commentators reflecting the polemical style of the thesis. If the thesis represents a 
political provocation in a polemical style, as I suggest, it is not surprising that it glosses 
over certain details. A far more significant (though connected) problem, relates to the 
thesis’ technologically deterministic, even teleological flavor. Stockmarr (2015: 306) 
notes, “the patterns of pacification, resistance, and response to Israel’s racialised 
interventions become part of the security production cycle”, noting that “the effectiveness 
of a given technology is measured by the link between the detection of a problem, or 
security threat and the manufacture of an innovative solution that mitigates the threat”. 
Halper (2015: 45) alleges that this innovation accounts for the global transmission of 
Israeli knowhow, claiming that Israel’s “Matrix of Control” is popular internationally 
“offering as it does an effective model of counterinsurgency, stabilization and long-term 
pacification”.  
  
 18 
Through these representations critics downplay stories about failures, challenges 
and disruptions faced in controlling and dispossessing Palestinians and translating the 
knowhow derived from these activities elsewhere. This is because they portray a 
perpetual cycle of innovation, whereby Palestinian resistance is itself re-appropriated by 
Israel as a vector of improvement. Khalili goes the furthest in confronting issues of 
failure, emphasizing that British and Israeli efforts to subdue Palestinian resistance have 
continuously fallen short of their objectives, driving searches for alternatives. Drawing on 
Foucault’s Discipline and Punish, she argues that “the failure to destroy nationalist 
sentiment has been met both by the British and the Israelis with a more determined 
commitment to reproduce—more perfectly—the very techniques that failed” (Khalili, 
2010: 427). Yet, making sense of the global transmission of British and Israeli policies, 
practices and technologies elsewhere is even less straightforward, precisely because their 
efficacy in suppressing violence is anything but obvious. Critics have effectively 
countered Israel’s official claims to “surgical” precision, confronting the logic that 
targeted killing constitutes a form of restraint (e.g. Weizman, 2008: 340). But this is 
where the critical interrogation of Israel’s claims to efficacy and precision largely ends. 
Although dismantling the slippery and duplicitous logic of Israel’s “lesser evil” necro-
economy, questions about how well (or poorly) Israel’s instruments of control perform 
are sidelined among claims about “frictionless and humanless separation” aided by Israeli 
“high technology” (Stockmarr, 2016: 70). 
 The term ‘efficacy’ is difficult to nail down and always a matter of perspective: 
the status of particular security policies, technologies or interventions as either successes 
or failures often remain vigorously contested. Moreover, the practical utility of any 
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product is never a good indication of its popularity. Yet what disappears in the laboratory 
thesis is the recognition that security solutions (Israeli or otherwise) always remain a 
fetish in Marx’s sense: their value is derived from a “mystical value not based on its use 
value” (Neocleous, 2008: 153). My point here is not that the ability to experiment in real 
life situations does not help Israeli firms refine and improve the performance of their 
tactics and technologies over time. It clearly does. Instead, I want to open up a discussion 
about how their improvements, limitations and failures square with their globalization, in 
ways that reconsider intuitive understandings about the relationships between 
innovations’ perceived preeminence and superiority. I return to this issue in the final 
section. Here I want to emphasize that the thesis’ technological determinism reflects an 
even more general and significant problem, namely its resonance with and reification of 
Zionism’s ideological underpinnings.  
Critical & affirmative convergences  
As noted above, it is not only critics who reference the laboratory in 
understanding Israel’s rise as a global security purveyor. This is not to equate mainstream 
policy literature and industry claims with critical uses of the concept. Their political ‘use 
values’ are diametrically opposed. Yet critical and affirmative references converge in 
significant ways. One realm of convergence is about the significance of real-life ‘testing’. 
As outlined above, the laboratory thesis suggests that Israeli state officials and industry 
actors view Palestinians as a surplus population and knowingly exploit this ‘resource’ in 
refining and marketing their solutions. In agreeing with Israeli official narratives that the 
exercise of Israeli state violence is progressive in character, however, critics straddle 
condemnation and validation. Weizman (2017) cites an Israeli general’s claim that “the 
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Israeli military had become ‘world champions in occupation’ and has managed to turn its 
control of millions of Palestinians into ‘an art form’”, conceding that “Such bragging is 
not necessarily an exaggeration”. Stockmarr (2015: 298, 305) argues that “Israel’s 
security innovation process and the role of Palestine as a ‘laboratory’ bind together intent 
and effect in one circular motion”, where Israel’s constant “refinement of the security 
apparatus” in border control “sustains the permanent siege of Palestine”. Thus on one 
hand, critics claim that Israeli policies are immoral, unjustified and ineffective at 
suppressing violence and destroying Palestinians’ political aspirations, further countering 
Israel’s self-proclaimed ability to conduct ‘surgical’ strikes. On the other hand, they 
suggest that access to live test sites has allowed Israel to approach a perfect system of 
domination, thereby reinforcing its self-professed claim to hold a ‘natural’ omnipotence 
over the global security field (see Tamari, 2009: 23).  
 In focusing on how Israel’s access to real-world test sites distinguishes its security 
industry from competitors, moreover, critics agree with proponents of Israeli statecraft 
that Palestine/Israel represents an exemplary ‘case’ of violence that is categorically 
different from others, whether in kind, duration, or intensity. That is, they suggest that 
Israel’s ability to test in real life in combination with other “internal factors” (Gordon, 
2009: 17) makes the Israel’s security industries “unique and unrivalled” (Feldman 2014; 
also see Halper 2015: 37). Weizman (2007: 9) uses the laboratory concept to develop 
such exceptional claims, noting that the brutality of the techniques used to control the 
OPT constitute “a laboratory of the extreme”. Elsewhere he implies a quantitative 
difference, representing Gaza as “the world’s largest laboratory for airborne 
assassinations” (Weizman, 2008: 330-1). Yet while the exceptional nature of 
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Palestine/Israel as a categorically different kind of experimental space is strongly 
suggested, the case for this is never made convincingly.  
 I return to questions about scale and exceptionality below. Here I want to focus on 
the significance of the convergence between critical and affirmative narratives. These 
overlaps do not simply reveal a common understanding of key facts between critics and 
proponents but a shared reliance on functionalist and technologically-deterministic 
reasoning. In exposing how the repression and killing of Palestinians is turned into a 
source of profit, critics can give the impression that even in its most repugnant forms, the 
control of Palestine constitutes a process of seamless refinement and innovation. This 
conflates the branding of Israeli security products as “combat proven” with an actual 
status as “proven effective” (Who Profits 2014). In doing so, the laboratory thesis helps 
reify (rather than disrupt) the teleological Zionist story of Israel as an innovative “startup 
nation” (Senor & Singer, 2009).  
 Despite its efforts to mount a challenge to Israel’s security industries, the 
laboratory thesis is potentially counterproductive to challenging their global reach. By 
this I mean that explicit criticisms of Israel’s security industries unwittingly work to 
reinforce and naturalize Israel’s dominant position as a security leader, providing free 
(and false) advertising. Halper (2015: 139) claims: “There are no grounds to doubt that 
the capabilities built into […Israeli security] systems […] can perform as advertised”. 
“Israel’s system of control”, Weizman (2017) maintains, “has […] hardened into an 
exceptionally efficient and brutal form of territorial apartheid”. I do not want to suggest 
that critical commentators have played any significant role in the expansion of Israel’s 
security industries nor that their work has been “weaponized” (Koopman, 2016). It is, 
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however, to emphasize that at the level of discourse (where the laboratory thesis 
intervenes), some of its claims resonate with the dominant evolutionary tropes of Israeli 
marketing materials and official narratives.  
Despite their provocative intentions, moreover, critical references to 
Palestine/Israel as a laboratory contribute to the representations of Palestinians as passive, 
disembodied objects of control and violence by replicating Israeli representations of 
Palestinians  “as mere rats in a laboratory […] to be experimented on at will” (Cook, 
2008: 211).  The laboratory thesis pays little attention to how Palestinians experience, re-
work or contest security laboratories as embodied, everyday realities. This reflects a more 
general tendency in literature on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that Palestinians are 
portrayed as “merely silent objects: Israel is the powerful side, and its politics are behind 
all the developments” (Ghanem, 2012: 365). This runs against efforts to re-situate 
Palestinians and their lived experiences at the centre of conversations about geopolitics 
(Harker, 2011; Smith, 2011; 2016). 
I have so far argued the dissonances between critical and affirmative uses of the 
laboratory concept—i.e. what they are disagreeing about – are insufficient and mostly 
normative. I now turn to a diagnosis of this convergence and its relationship to the thesis’ 
broader deficiencies. I posit that the thesis’ limitations come from three sources, one 
theoretical, one methodological and one related to the kind of political intervention that 
the laboratory thesis articulates. The theoretical problem is rather simple: the laboratory 
thesis does not theorize, problematize or even elaborate the concept of the laboratory as 
such (also see Tamari, 2009). Scholars discuss the multiple ways that empirical dynamics 
associated with the colonization of Palestine can be understood as a kind of ongoing real-
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life experiment. Within these accounts, however, what (scientific or ‘real-world’) 
laboratories are and do is assumed to be self-evident and widely agreed upon. Yet these 
operating assumptions are not the subject of debate or theorization, meaning that use of 
the term is loose and commonsensical: once policies, practices or technologies are 
introduced to real-world settings, their efficacy can be ‘tested’, producing ‘lessons 
learned’ to be imparted elsewhere.    
The methodological issues concern epistemological questions about how critics 
analyze industry actors and their claims but also the thickness of their descriptions. The 
laboratory thesis is based on empirical data including interviews with key officials as 
well as analysis of promotional materials and policy documents. One reason why critics 
of Israeli statecraft use the laboratory metaphor is because security professionals employ 
it within their discourses. Although critics have derived powerful insights from this 
material, they have treated official narratives as authentic and unproblematic. 
Finally, the laboratory thesis suffers from limitations related to its strategy of 
provocation as revelation. The laboratory thesis attempts to expose concealed truths 
behind Israel’s rise as a global security purveyor. It has uncovered convincing evidence 
that Israeli officials view Palestinians as a surplus population and exploit this ‘resource’. 
Yet precisely because representatives of Israel security industry brag that their security 
knowhow is derived from real-life testing, critics struggle to provide information that is 
entirely new. Elements of the “big secret” (Feldman 2014) behind Israel’s success as a 
global security purveyor are not terribly well-guarded. More importantly, the thesis’ 
critique ultimately upholds much of Zionism’s teleological progressivism. 
We seem headed toward the conclusion that the laboratory metaphor needs to be 
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dispensed with altogether because it does more harm than good. This remains a 
possibility that cannot be dismissed out of hand. Yet if we reference ‘laboratory’ in scare 
quotes or abandon it altogether, we cede the term’s meaning to the authors and apologists 
of colonial violence. Rather than claiming that the concept is inherently unhelpful, I want 
to suggest that its utility depends on how it is mobilized. Indeed, one of the best 
arguments in favor of re-assembling the concept is that it is deployed more responsibly 
by some than others. In the following section I therefore discuss some possible ways 
forward.  
3. RE-ASSEMBLING THE LABORATORY THESIS  
 In this section, I propose some ways for developing the concept of 
policing/security laboratories further as well as exploring considerations surrounding 
methodology and approaches to critique. These proposals remain tentative but reflect a 
broader set of challenges and opportunities related to critical writing on settler 
colonialism and the global war on terror, building on the strongest formulations of the 
laboratory thesis to date. As I have stressed, Khalili’s work avoids key pitfalls of the 
laboratory concept’s usage. She helpfully moves beyond discussions of Palestine’s 
depiction as a hermetically sealed zone, grappling with its making as an exemplary 
“node” of global violence. Yet Khalili largely adopts the laboratory’s commonsensical 
usage. Moreover, her handling of issues of failure and institutional reproduction, though 
instructive, is unsatisfying. Her deference to Discipline and Punish recalls critiques of 
Foucault’s own functionalism (Garland, 1986). There is no any easy way out of this 
dilemma but approaching the re-assembly the laboratory thesis as part of a critique of 
Zionism (see below) provides possibilities. I explore these in three sections below: 
  
 25 
theory, methodology and political strategy.  
Theory 
 In beginning to develop the concept of ‘real world’ laboratories further, I take 
inspiration from what Acuto and Curtis (2014) term “assemblage thinking”, incorporating 
approaches from actor-network theory (ANT), science and technology studies (STS) and 
assemblage theory, though do not reflect on the distinctions between these approaches. 
Following Collier (2014) I move away from abstract theorization, focusing on the 
motivations of inquiry and practical considerations about how to carry out successful 
assemblage thinking. This is not some radical departure. Proponents of the laboratory 
thesis have engaged with assemblage thinking, sometimes drawing on Latourian ideas 
(e.g. Weizman, 2012: 323). Walters (2014) extends Weizman’s work in understanding 
relationships between materiality and security, mobilizing conceptual resources from 
ANT. Moreover, scholars of Palestine have utilized ANT within the study of colonial 
government in Palestine (Shamir, 2013). Building on this work, I focus rather more 
narrowly on how assemblage thinking can help to redress thesis’ lack of problematization 
of policing/security laboratories as well as its technologically-deterministic inclinations. 
In contrast to the loose and commonsensical ‘uses’ of the laboratory above, 
STS/ANT scholars have carefully interrogated laboratories as part of their efforts to 
challenge the most taken-for-granted underpinnings of modernism and social theory. 
They take a counterintuitive approach to “laboratory life”, guided by an “irreverent 
approach” to the study of science (Latour and Woolgar, 1986: 29). ANT emerges out of 
discussions about the social construction of scientific facts, focusing on the central role of 
scientific laboratories in constructing truth claims. This focus on “construction” does not 
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mean that scientific facts are not true. What first-hand study of scientific laboratories 
revealed, rather, was that “to be contrived and to be objective went together” (Latour, 
2005: 90). ANT is also a direct response to problems of technological determinism within 
the study of science and technology – guided by a denaturalizing impulse. ANT actively 
seeks “to free the matters of fact from their reduction by ‘Nature’”, challenging the idea 
of a “direct relation between being real and being indisputable” (Latour, 2005: 109, 112). 
As such, ANT addresses how truth claims are constructed, whilst showing the potential 
for things to be otherwise.  
ANT further provides concrete insights into how laboratories function, capturing 
their territorial and relational dimensions. Clearly, scientific laboratories have very real 
physical boundaries. Yet how laboratories produce truth claims, according to ANT 
scholars, is precisely not because they are insulated and disconnected; the very ‘inside’ 
character of laboratories is a direct function of the relationship of scientists to the 
‘outside’ world. ANT situates the laboratory as a physical site of experimentation as well 
as a relational construct, operating through interactions that bring disparate elements 
together (Miller & O’Leary, 1994: 469). This representation unsettles the conception of 
“testing” as a process, which proves the effectiveness of a given idea.  ANT scholars 
argue that scientific facts are not verified independently inside the space of the laboratory 
but rather validated through their “extension” into other arenas of social reality, thereby 
consolidating truth effects (Latour and Woolgar, 1986: 182). This rendering of 
laboratories provides further insights into qualifying the relative significance of particular 
laboratories over others. “Any laboratory scale is, potentially, immensely small or big. It 
would be foolish, on the observer’s part, to decide in advance and for good what its real 
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size is” (Latour, 2005: 180, emphasis in original). Doing so would be to prematurely 
decide this as a settled matter rather than opening it up as a question to be investigated 
empirically.  
These insights resonate with key claims of the laboratory thesis but also offer 
points of disjuncture. In accordance with the thesis’ efforts to broaden understandings of 
the laboratory, ANT scholars have long called for expanding the definition of laboratories 
beyond actual scientific laboratories (e.g. Miller and O’Leary, 1994). ANT renderings of 
laboratories further resonate with the thesis’ use of ‘laboratory’ to capture the artificial 
(rather than ‘natural’) character of patterns in Palestine/Israel. And like ANT, the thesis 
invokes the concept laboratory in understanding the production of truth claims. Yet ANT 
formulations of laboratories offer three key counterpoints to the thesis’ rendering of the 
laboratory. First, if the laboratory metaphor is relevant to Palestine/Israel, it is not 
because it is ‘hermetically sealed’ zone cut off from the ‘outside’ world. Rather the 
emphasis needs to be placed on how its connections with other places are developed, 
enabling a range of disparate elements to be brought together. The fact that complex 
assemblages are at work in the production/mobility of security solutions branded as 
‘Israeli’ is not an afterthought to be brushed aside. It should be placed front and center in 
re-thinking policing/security laboratories. Yet this does not render different actors as a 
single “transnational unit” (Graham 2011b). 
Second, ANT provides a framework through which to make sense of how certain 
forms of knowledge, practices and technologies become generalized without conceding 
that this outcome reflects their superiority. ANT scholars closely grapple with issues of 
success and failure in understanding broader questions of institutional re-production, 
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drawing attention to how outcomes of policies and projects “are negotiated and gradually 
realized as functions of success or failure” rather than treating “success” and “failure” as 
uncontested descriptors (Latour, 1996: 184). The closely related literature on the 
historical sociology of technology (including that of weapons systems) (MacKenzie, 
1990, 1996) has reversed intuitive ideas about how certain technologies become seen as 
universal and superior. Technologies, MacKenzie (1996: 7) argues, “may be best because 
they have triumphed, rather than triumphing because they are best”. 
Finally, assemblage thinking gives us reason to be cautions about making claims 
about Palestine/Israel being, “unrivalled”, “largest” or most “extreme” and proceeding to 
use this exceptional qualification as a way to account for Israel’s disproportionate degree 
of influence in shaping global patterns of violence. There can be no simple reason why 
certain experiences of violence are looked at as exemplars and others not. However, the 
fact that the vast majority of conflicts around the world do not come to be seen as case 
studies with valuable ‘lessons learned’ challenges the idea that policing/security 
laboratories exist in a straightforward ‘natural’ sense. This resonates with ANT’s 
conception of laboratories as quintessentially artificial spaces. Similarly, Mitchell (2002)  
argues that ‘cases’ do not exist in nature but rather develop through the colonial practices 
and forms of knowledge used to make them knowable and thereby governable.1 He 
shows how the forms of expertise used to describe cases do not simply ‘discover’ some 
preexisting empirical reality ‘on the ground’, but instead constitute this reality, whilst 
claiming to stand outside of it. Mitchell thereby gestures to the importance of grasping 
                                                        
1 Mitchell (2011) does make a few passing references to places/experiments as ‘laboratories’ in the loose 
way that I have critiqued. 
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how the ‘reality’ of certain ‘cases’ come to be understood as such rather than accepting 
their existence as stable and pre-given.  
Methodology 
Methodologically, I would like to propose a few ways forward for researching the 
sites, spaces, discourses and networks that sustain the global war on terror. In trying to 
understand how certain forms of violence come to be seen as exemplary without 
naturalizing these representations, genealogical analyses of particular “war-economies” 
would be apt, precisely because it would help to reveal the contingencies of certain 
historical examples as models of dispossession and militarism. Existing genealogies of 
counter-terrorism have shown how Israeli state actors gained traction within these early 
debates and defined their underlying terms (Stampnitzky, 2013). Ethnographic 
approaches also offer fruitful opportunities. Despite references to certain spaces and 
relationships as laboratory-like, there has been no attempt to conduct accounts of  
“laboratory life” within the actual scientific laboratories where Israeli weapons and 
security technologies are developed. There are enormous ethical and practical challenges 
of doing this. Nevertheless, as Gusterson's (1998) anthropological analysis of nuclear 
weapons laboratories demonstrates, there are fruitful possibilities for critical ethnographic 
study within these well-guarded sites of state power. We would also benefit from 
ethnographic accounts of the spaces where modes of warfare and control are allegedly 
‘tested out’. Building on feminist geopolitics (Dowler & Sharp, 2001) and subaltern 
geopolitics (Sharp, 2011) literatures, there is much more to be said about how the 
policing/security practices experienced and embodied realities by those who cope with 
and resist everyday forms of violence, extending illuminating studies of infrastructure in 
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Palestine in this vein (e.g. Jabary-Salamanca, 2015: 172). Such a focus would help to 
reclaim the agency of actors in the global South to move beyond their prevailing 
representation voiceless “lab assistants” or “human test subjects” (Bilgin, 2016: 172).  
 If claims about the repercussions of these transactions are to carry more weight, 
more needs to be done to empirically “follow” (Peck and Theodore, 2012) 
policing/security policies, practices and technologies transnationally and unpack the 
meaning of  “learning” (see McFarlane, 2011). Here there are also significant obstacles 
related to the secrecy that surrounds policing and security agencies particularly after the 
September 11th attacks (see Coleman, 2016), limiting the extent to which the 
repercussions of knowledges and technologies can be observed and qualified as they 
circulate. We also need to find ways to analyze the rich empirical data found within 
professional security discourse that more self-consciously avoids (re)producing official 
claims and terms of debate. Industry narratives should not be approached as 
unproblematic admissions as per Graham (2010b: 41) but as ideological and at times 
deeply misleading re-presentations to be critically interrogated. In short, they need to be 
taken seriously, not literally.  
Political strategy 
In relation to re-articulating the laboratory thesis as a radical political provocation,  
I have suggested that a focus on revelation will not do. This issue pertains not only to 
settler colonial studies but concerns questions about critical research on violence and 
geopolitics. As Cowen (2012) points out in relation to the study of militarism, we need to 
question the limitations of critiques by way of exposure to ensure that such interventions 
actually transform rather than “recharge” the terms of debate by “cultivating alternative 
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knowledge, vision and practice”. Towards this end, bringing new perspectives into the 
conversation is necessary. Yet this move is insufficient. We also need to actively re-make 
the prevailing geographical imaginations that the global ‘war on terror’ depends on and 
sustains by interrogating of the temporal narratives that represent time as linear and 
progressive (Closs Stephens, 2011). Following Butler's (2012) critique of Zionism,  
critical analysis of security industries can more effectively challenge the teleology of 
official narratives of innovation and progress in the face of dangers. Drawing on Walter 
Benjamin, Butler (2012: 223-4) argues that, “Catastrophe is precisely not a chain of 
events where something in the past leads to something in the future. Under conditions of 
catastrophe, there is only one catastrophe, and it keeps on happening”. So while 
acknowledging that strategies and tactics of settler colonialism can and do change over 
time, our analysis of these changes must more explicitly disrupt the basic terms of 
Zionism’s progressivism. We cannot simply oppose Zionism’s aims but must contest the 
way in which it (and other forms of domination) ideologically structure our 
understanding of historical and technological change, thereby taking up Shenhav's (2006) 
call to move beyond the “methodological Zionism” underpinning the epistemologies of 
even some of Israel’s most ardent critics. This concern is not limited to Zionism. As 
Veracini (2010: 99) argues, it is settler colonialism’s “linear narrative structure”, which 
defines it in structural contradistinction from other colonial forms, noting that “settler 
colonialism mobilises peoples in the teleological expectation of irreversible 
transformation”. Recognizing and challenging this tendency is thus paramount 
analytically but also essential to charting new political possibilities for radical 
scholarship.   
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 It is for this reason in particular that I have devoted close attention to ANT: it 
emerges as a refutation of technological determinism and the reduction of reality to 
‘nature’. Given critiques of this literature for its aversion to making normative claims, my 
suggestion to engage with it may seem contradictory. However, I would suggest that such 
a reading is misguided. Scholars have productively used ANT to open up questions about 
the kinds of relations and conditions under which new kinds of politics and possibilities 
for contestation might emerge in the context of extraction and violent dispossession 
(Mitchell, 2011). As Mitchell notes, understanding the ways in which opportunities for 
contestation and politics arise should never be understood in a general way based on a 
pre-defined set of external conditions, such as life under occupation (Abourahme & 
Jabary-Salamanca, 2016: 751). The emphasis, rather, should be placed on locating 
“histories of vulnerability or points of vulnerability and trying to identify where those 
points of vulnerability lie” (ibid: 752). ANT’s central focus on the roles of socio-
technical controversies further addresses how “political subjects become not just objects 
of sociotechnical experiments but participants in them” (Mitchell, 2011: 240). None of 
this is implies that ANT should be immune from scrutiny, especially given its own 
complicity in the marginalization of indigenous knowledges (Todd, 2016).  
CONCLUSION          
 This article has reconsidered how far the laboratory thesis takes us, both 
analytically and politically. While the thesis provocatively interrogates how Israel’s 
experience as a settler colony has been re-packaged as an export commodity, I argue that 
it dangerously upholds many of the industry’s core narratives and terms of debate. 
Although the laboratory thesis represents an important a timely provocation into re-
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thinking the terms of the Israel-Palestine conflict and its relationships to global patterns 
of violence and militarism, its mode of critique has made it considerably less disruptive 
than it might – and should – be. Critical uses of the laboratory concept re-produce “a 
paradigm that is hermetically sealed and has the force of nature” from which “[t]here 
seems to be no escape” (Tamari, 2009: 23). This reflects a wider tendency by critical 
analysts to normalize familiar “scripts” of global processes, thereby contributing to the 
perceived dominance of centers of power and the inevitability of certain trends (Gibson-
Graham, 2006: Ch. 6).  
That Naomi Klein agrees with right-wing Israeli scholars that Palestine/Israel 
functions as a laboratory of ‘real-world’ experimentation is striking. Despite their 
differing operating assumptions and conclusions, both sides are clearly talking about 
many of the same dynamics, i.e. patterns of unending war, settlement construction, the 
building of the separation barrier, etc. This might suggest the concept’s aptness in 
capturing and theorizing empirical trends regardless of the authors’ political orientations. 
Yet I read this convergence in another way: it does not simply reflect the fact that critics 
and proponents of Israel’s security industries are talking about the same trends but more 
worryingly, shared terms of analysis between proponents of Israeli statecraft and their 
opponents. The principle sources of disagreement between critics and proponents are 
whether the laboratory’s existence is intended or unintended, whether this ‘fact’ is 
something to be celebrated or condemned. These are mostly normative disagreements 
about the legitimacy of Israeli state violence and the state’s self-declared status as a 
liberal ‘Western’ democracy. The way the term ‘laboratory’ is invoked, however is 
largely consistent: critics and proponents of Israel both agree that Palestine/Israel is a 
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laboratory (in an empirical sense) and that this status helps to explain other key trends, 
such as Israel’s status as a global security and high-tech superpower (in an analytic 
sense). In other words, critics do not tell an alternative story about how Israel’s 
technological prowess has been constituted but instead tell a very similar story toward a 
different conclusion.  
 What makes the concept of the laboratory appealing is its ability to ‘explain’ the 
rise of Israel’s security industry in a self-evident way. The problem is that critics have 
accepted a rather impoverished, atheoretical and apolitical understanding of what 
laboratories are and do, which is not ultimately very analytical at all. Much like 
“geopolitics”, “laboratory” has become “a free-floating signifier” (Ó Tuathail, 1996: 139) 
that appears as obvious and unproblematic. Yet I have shown that when scrutinized, the 
term can productively unsettle and denaturalize how the colonization of Palestine is 
related to various else-wheres. I have therefore proposed some preliminary alternative 
possibilities for re-assembling the laboratory as a critical analytic that might more aptly 
address how security laboratories actually function and in doing so break apart Zionism’s 
“narrative lockdown” (Butler 2012: 25) over efforts to theorize, politicize and contest 
these dynamics. It is incumbent on critical scholars to foreground the constitutive role of 
violence in settler colonial domination. Yet in doing so, we must avoid tacitly reifying the 
supposed genius at the heart of nation-building projects and the triumphalist narratives of 
progress that surround and sustain them. Otherwise we risk ceding an undue level of 
coherence and omnipotence to colonial enterprises, silencing the voices that help us find 
fissures and contradictions within them. In conclusion, I want to emphasize that the 
concerns raised about the laboratory thesis travel well beyond discussions about 
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Palestine/Israel. They reflect a far wider set of challenges about how to conduct critical 
research on the global war on terror without reifying the dominant terms of analysis and 
public debate (see Toros, 2017).  They may even travel further than this. Across the 
social sciences, countless empirical examples are represented as “laboratories” for 
understanding phenomenon X or Y.  These wide-ranging but highly uncritical references 
invite a broad re-appraisal of the term’s meaning and potential utility. This article has 
sought to illuminate the political stakes of such a debate and sketch a preliminary path 
forward for re-invigorating the laboratory as a productive critical concept within but also 
beyond studies of violence and militarism. 
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